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Abstract—In this paper, we present a complete system for on-
device passive monitoring, collection, and analysis of fine-grained,
large-scale packet measurements from mobile devices. First, we
describe the design and implementation of AntMonitor as a user-
space mobile app based on a VPN-service but only on the device
(without the need to route through a remote VPN server) and
using only the minimum resources required. We evaluate our
prototype and show that it significantly outperforms prior state-
of-the-art approaches: it achieves throughput of over 90 Mbps
downlink and 65 Mbps uplink, which is 2x and 8x faster than
mobile-only baselines and is 94% of the throughput without VPN,
while using 2–12x less energy. Second, we show that AntMonitor
is uniquely positioned to serve as a platform for passive on-
device mobile network monitoring and to enable a number of
applications, including: (i) real-time detection and prevention of
private information leakage from the device to the network; (ii)
passive network performance monitoring; and (iii) application
classification and user profiling. We showcase preliminary results
from a pilot user study at a university campus.
I. INTRODUCTION
In addition to the large and ever-increasing volume of
mobile network traffic [1], mobile devices are used today for a
range of personal activities (from communication to financial
transactions) and have access to personally identifiable infor-
mation (PII). User behavior and third-party activity eventually
manifest themselves as packets transmitted over the mobile
network. Therefore, looking at the network activity on a
mobile device provides a unique vantage point for monitoring
and inferring a wealth of information, including PII leaks,
network performance and user behavior.
There is a rich body of literature [2], [3], [4], [5], [6],
[7], [8], [9] which studies network traffic traces, and the
approaches typically fall into one of two categories: either
large-scale but coarse-grained traces obtained in the middle
of the network, i.e., traces from Internet Service Providers
(ISP) [2], [3], or fine-grained but small-scale traces from a
limited set of users [4], [5]. These limitations, privacy and
security concerns, and performance bottlenecks have hindered
progress.
In this paper, we present AntMonitor: a system for on-
device passive collection and analysis of fine-grained, large-
scale, mobile network measurements. We argue that Ant-
Monitor is well-positioned to become a high-performance
passive monitoring tool for crowdsourcing a range of mobile
network measurements, as it combines the following desired
All authors were with UCI when this work was conducted. A. Le is now
with Shoelace Wireless and M. Gjoka is with Google.
properties: (i) it is easy to install (it does not require admin-
istrative privileges) and use (it runs as a service app in the
background); (ii) it scales well with the number of users thanks
to its on-device design; (iii) it provides users with fine-grained
control of which data to monitor or log; (iv) it supports real-
time analysis on the device and/or off-line analysis on a log
server, but does not intercept packets in middleboxes and (iv)
it allows for semantic-rich annotation of packet traces with
contextual information from the device.
We start by presenting the design and evaluation of Ant-
Monitor. AntMonitor is a user-space mobile app, based on
a VPN service (which intercepts all packets without rooting
the phones) and routes packets directly to their destination
(by translating all connections on the device, without redi-
recting them through a remote VPN server).1 Our software
architecture uses the minimum number of resources to achieve
the highest performance, including (i) the minimum number
of threads for network routing (two: one for reading/writing
from/to the TUN) and (ii) the minimum number of sockets
(by multiplexing UDP sockets and carefully managing TCP
sockets), so as to not interfere with the performance of the
foreground apps. Thanks to these and other design choices,
AntMonitor significantly outperforms all prior state-of-the-
art approaches, in terms of throughput and energy, without
significantly impacting CPU and memory usage. More specif-
ically, experiments show that AntMonitor achieves 2x (down-
link) and 8x (uplink) throughput of state-of-the-art mobile-
only approaches, namely Privacy Guard [10] and Haystack
[11]. The achieved downlink throughput is also at 94% of the
throughput without VPN, and almost double the throughput
of comparable client-server approaches; all while using 2–12x
less energy. We believe that this performance advantage is
crucial for the successful adoption of AntMonitor by users.
However much users may care about added-value services,
they are unlikely to install apps that slow down their phones
or drain their battery.
Then, we demonstrate that AntMonitor naturally lends
itself as a platform for a range of applications that build
on top of passive on-device network monitoring, which can
be of interest to individual users, network operators, and
researchers. First, we use AntMonitor to detect and pre-
vent in real-time leakage of private information (PIIs) from
1Throughout the paper, we will refer to this approach as mobile-only, and to
using a remote VPN server as client-server. In both cases, a separate logging
server may be used for uploading logs from the device for subsequent offline
analysis.
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2the device to the network. We show that AntMonitor was
able to detect a large volume of PII leaks and the des-
tinations where this information goes to, and we provide
visualization of this information on the mobile device (in
real-time) and/or on our LogServer (off-line) [12]. Second,
we use AntMonitor for passive performance measurements
network-wide (e.g., network performance maps) as well as
per-user (usage profiles) or per-app. This information comes
at no additional overhead (e.g., no active probing is needed)
since AntMonitor touches every packet transmitted over the
network, and can provide insights into network usage and
provisioning as well as fine-grained information. Third, we use
the packet traces collected by AntMonitor, extract features
only from TCP/IP headers, annotate them with rich contextual
information available on the device (such as location, time,
foreground/background apps, etc.) to train machine learning
models. We use these models for traffic classification of flows
to applications (achieving higher classification accuracy than
state-of-art methods that use HTTP payloads [13]) as well as
for user profiling based on minimal information. We present
results from a pilot user study at a university campus to
demonstrate the capabilities of AntMonitor and its enabling
potential for these applications.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section
II presents related work. Section III describes the objectives,
design, and implementation of the AntMonitor system. Sec-
tion IV presents performance evaluation and comparison to
state-of-the-art approaches. Section V describes the applica-
tions of AntMonitor to three domains, namely: privacy leak
detection and prevention (Section V-A); passive monitoring
of network performance (Section V-B); and application and
user classification (Section V-C). Section VI concludes and
discusses directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. VPN-based Mobile Network Monitoring
The approach we follow in AntMonitor is passive moni-
toring on the device, guided by the design objectives outlined
in Section III-A. In particular, the only way to intercept every
packet in and out of the mobile device, while running in user
space (without root or custom OS), today, is to establish a
VPN service on the device. There are two VPN approaches:
client-server and mobile-only, described below.
In Client-Server VPN approaches, packets are tunneled
from the VPN client on the mobile device to a remote VPN
server, where they can be processed or logged. A repre-
sentative of this approach is Meddle [13], which builds on
top of the StrongSwan [14] VPN software. Disadvantages
of this approach include the fact that packets are routed
through a middle server thus posing additional delay and pri-
vacy concerns, lack of client-side annotation (thus no ground
truth available at the server), and potentially complex control
mechanisms (the client has to communicate the selections of
functionalities, e.g., ad blocking, to the server). In [15], a
client-server system was proposed that remedied the latter two
disadvantages by building a custom client app. An advantage
of the client-server approach is that it can be combined
with other VPN and proxy services (e.g., encryption, private
browsing), and be offered by ISPs as an added-value service.
In Mobile-Only VPN approaches, the client establishes
a VPN service on the phone to intercept all IP packets
and does not require a VPN server for routing. It extracts
the content of captured outgoing packets and sends them
through newly created protected UDP/TCP sockets [16] to
reach Internet hosts; and vice versa for incoming packets. This
approach may have high overhead due to this layer-3 to layer-
4 translation, the need to maintain state per connection and
additional processing per packet. If not carefully implemented,
this approach can significantly affect network throughput:
for example, see the poor performance of tPacketCapture
[17] – an application currently available on Google Play
that utilizes this mobile-only approach. Two state-of-the-art
representatives of the mobile-only approach are Haystack
[11], [18] and Privacy Guard [10]. They both focus on
applying and optimizing their systems for detection of PII
leaks. The AntMonitor system describe din this paper, also
follows the mobile-only VPN approach but can achieve 2x and
8x their downlink and uplink throughput, as shown in Section
IV and summarized in Section II-D.
B. Other Monitoring Approaches
Work on monitoring network traffic generated by mobile
devices can be roughly classified according to the vantage
point and measurement approach.
Rooted phones and OS approaches. Using a custom OS or
a rooted phone one can get access to fine-grained information
on the device, including network traffic. Phonelab [7] and
others [5], [4], [9] use packet capture APIs such as tcpdump
or iptables-log. These are powerful but inherently limited
to small scale-deployment as the overwhelming majority of
users do not have rooted phones, and wireless providers
and phone manufacturers strongly discourage rooting. The
same limitation applies to OS-based approaches, including:
TaintDroid that uses a custom OS, [19], MockDroid [20]
and AppFence [21] that dynamically intercept any permission
request to certain resources, AndroidLeaks [22] and PiOS
[23] that use static analysis.
Active Measurements from Mobile Devices. There are
mobile apps, developed by researchers Netalyzr [24], Mo-
bilyzer [25] or the industry (e.g., Speedtest, CarrierIQ
or Tutella), to perform active network measurements of
various metrics (throughput, latency, RSS) from the mobile
device. They run in user space, without root, and allow for
accurate measurements. However, care must be given to avoid
burdening the device’s resources and crowdsourcing is often
used to distribute the load (see Section 2.3).
Passive Monitoring Inside the Network. ISPs and other
organizations sometimes can capture packets on links in the
middle of their networks, e.g. at an ISP’s or other organiza-
tion’s network [26], [27], [28]. Researchers typically analyze
network traces collected by others (e.g. large tier-1 networks
[2] or from university campus WiFi networks [3]). Limitations
of this approach include that (i) it only captures traffic going
through the particular measurement point and (ii) it has access
3only to packet headers (payload is increasingly encrypted), not
to ground truth or semantic-rich information (e.g. apps that
produced the packets).
C. Applications of Network Monitoring
Privacy Leaks Detection. Next, we review work on detect-
ing private data leaking out of a device, which is related to
our first application in Section V-A. Some approaches require
a custom OS or rooting the phone, such as as TaintDroid
[19] was one of the early tools built to identify privacy leaks
in real-time, and others reviewed in Section II-B .
Another approach is to allow the user to define strings
(e.g., IMEI, device id, email, or any string corresponding to
sensitive information that the user wants to protect) and then
monitor for potential leaking of that information from the
device to the network. AntMonitor (as well as Haystack and
Privacy Guard) follow this approach: they monitor, on the
device itself, the payload of all outgoing packets, searching
for the predefined strings. In order to detect leaked strings
in encrypted traffic, all three tools need a TLS proxy to first
decrypt the traffic before string matching. Although the goal is
the same, implementation matters: AntMonitor is currently
the only tool that can prevent (i.e., block or hash the private
string), in addition to detection, on the mobile device without
root privileges; AntMonitor and Privacy Guard can perform
real-time detection, while Haystack does not.
Recon [29] also inspects packets for privacy leakage, but
because it builds on top of Meddle [13], all packet processing
(including privacy leaks detection) happens not on the device
itself but on the Meddle server, with all the advantages and
disadvantages of a client-server VPN discussed in Section
II-A. Recon is also the first to use machine learning to
identify flows that leak private data without prior knowledge
of the users’ PII, based on HTTP features and training on user
feedback, as well as on ground truth, manually obtained. This
approach is also applicable to AntMonitor.
Performance Monitoring. Typically, network performance
measurements (e.g. signal strength, throughput, delay) are
outsourced to companies (some of them drive around and
measure the networks) and/or are crowdsourced from in-
dividual users. Examples of third-party companies include:
Carrier IQ [30], which is embedded in the firmware of over
150M smartphones and reports network information, signal
strength and the users’ location; Tutella, which provides a
network performance SDK that can be embedded in other
mobile applications; and Mobilyzer [25], which provides an
open platform for controllable mobile network measurements.
Examples of crowdsourcing projects include Speedtest [31],
OpenSig-nals [32], Sensorly [33], and RootMetrics [34].
These companies make mobile applications that allow users
to perform and report active measurements; the companies
use that data to release performance reports [35] and awards
[36] for cellular and Wi-Fi at points of interest (e.g., metro
areas, airports, sports venues, etc). Work in [8] analyzed
crowdsourced data from Speedtest in order to compare the
performance of cellular and Wi-Fi networks in large metro
areas. Work in [37] released an app for crowdsourcing mea-
surements of throughput and latency over LTE and Wi-Fi.
Similar to some of these approaches, AntMonitor crowd-
sources measurements from an end-user app. Contrary to the
above apps, it can passively infer network performance metrics
(e.g. throughput), without sending active probes. It can be
used to create both network-wide performance maps and user-
specific statistics, as discussed in Section V-B.
Learning. Several papers [38], [39], [2], [40] perform app
classification of flows by building signatures from unencrypted
HTTP sessions in network traces: in [2], the HTTP User-Agent
field was used to map flows into apps; in [38], HTTP header
key-value pairs were used to build unique app signatures that
operate on a per-flow basis; in [39], more flows could be
identified by expanding the usage of tokens in the HTTP
headers (beyond HTTP request data) and by propagating the
identification of a flow mapped to a specific app to other flows
that occur at the same time; in [40], conjunctive rules are
constructed from HTTP header data. All these methods rely
on HTTP headers whereas we perform app classification using
only TCP/IP headers in Section V-C.
Early work on behavioral analysis classified protocols based
on packet headers: graphlets [41], profiling tend-hosts [42],
traffic dispersion graphs [43], subflows [44]. Prior work on
user profiling includes: [45], which uses HMM classifiers on
NetFlow records to fingerprint users behind NAT, and [46],
which re-identifies users over different web sessions.
D. Relation to our own prior work
In our Sigcomm 2015 C2BID workshop [15], we presented
a preliminary design and evaluation of AntMonitor based on
the client-server VPN approach. In Mobicom 2015 Demos (3-
page paper and best demo in S3) [47], we also demonstrated
the use of that client-server version to detect privacy leaks. In
contrast, in this paper, we present the mobile-only design of
AntMonitor and we show that it significantly outperforms
all state-of-the-art approaches, including previous mobile-
only Haystack [11], [18] (app available since Oct. 2015)
and Privacy Guard [10] (open source), as well as server-
based approaches (e.g., StrongSwan, Meddle [13], and our
own prior AntMonitor client-server system), as discussed
in Section IV. In this paper we also present three possible
applications of the AntMonitor system, namely privacy leaks
(Section V-A), performance monitoring (Section V-B), and
learning of network-level behavior (Section V-C), based on an
8 month user study (which is analyzed for the first time in this
paper). We have outlined the first and the second applications
in 2-page posters [47] and [48], respectively, while the third
application is presented for the first time in this paper.
III. THE ANTMONITOR SYSTEM
A. Design Rationale
Here we describe the main objectives of AntMonitor and
the key design choices made to meet the objectives.
Objective 1: Large-Scale Measurements: AntMonitor is
intended for crowdsourcing data from a large number of
users, which poses a number of system requirements. First,
the app on the mobile device must run without administrative
privileges (root access). To that end, we use the public Virtual
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Fig. 1: The AntMonitor Architecture. It consists of the Ant-
Monitor App (on the device) and a remote LogServer.
Private Network (VPN) API [16] provided by the Android
OS (version 4.0+), which runs on more than 95% of Android
devices [49]. Second, in order for a large number of mobile
users to adopt it, user experience must not be affected:
monitoring must occur seamlessly in the background while
the user continues to use the mobile device as usual, and
the overhead on the device must be negligible in terms of
network throughput, CPU, battery, and data cost. Third, the
performance must scale with the number of users, which
makes a strong case for a mobile-only design.
Objective 2: Making it Attractive for Users: There must
also be incentives for users to participate and AntMonitor is
designed with the capability to offer users a variety of services.
The current prototype offers enhanced privacy protection (e.g.,
preventing leakage of private information) and visualizations
that help users understand where their data flows (e.g. see Fig.
2(f)). Additional services can be implemented completely on
the mobile, such as enhanced wireless network performance by
switching among available networks; see Sec. V-B. The Ant-
Monitor App is also designed to provide users with control
over which data they choose to monitor and log, including
which applications to monitor, and whether to log full packets
or headers only.
Objective 3: Fine-Grained Information: AntMonitor sup-
ports full-packet capture of incoming and outgoing traffic in
PCAP Next Generation format [50], which allows to append
arbitrary information alongside the raw packets. This is im-
portant because, in many cases, this contextual information
may only be collected accurately on the mobile at the time
of packet capture, and can play a critical role in subsequent
analyses. Examples of such contextual information include
names of apps that generate the packets (thus providing ground
truth for application classification, see Section V-C), location,
background apps, and information about the network used (e.g.
WiFi or LTE, network speed, etc.).
B. System Design
To support the above design objectives, AntMonitor is
designed to provide the following four main functionalities:
traffic interception, routing, logging, and analysis. The ratio-
nale for the first two is described here and implementation and
optimizations for all four are provided in Sec. III-C and III-E.
Traffic Interception. The AntMonitor App establishes
a VPN service on the device that runs seamlessly in the
background. The service is able to intercept all outgoing
and incoming IP datagrams by creating a virtual (layer-3)
TUN interface [16] and updating the routing table so that all
outgoing traffic, generated by any app on the device, is sent
to the TUN interface. The AntMonitor App then routes the
datagrams to their target hosts on the Internet (as described
below). When a host responds, the response will be routed
back to the AntMonitor App, which then sends the response
packets to the apps by writing them to TUN.
Traffic Routing. To route IP datagrams generated by the
mobile apps and arriving at the TUN interface, the intuitive
solution would be to use raw sockets, which unfortunately is
not available on non-rooted devices. Therefore, the datagrams
have to be sent out using layer-4 (UDP/TCP) sockets, which
can be done in one of the following two ways:
1. Client-Server Routing: This follows the design of a
typical VPN service: all traffic is routed through a VPN
server [14], [13], [15]. The main advantage is the simplicity
of implementation: the routing is done seamlessly by the
operating system at the server with IP forwarding enabled.
However, in a crowdsourcing system with a large number of
users, sending all traffic through a VPN server faces scalability
challenges. Furthermore, users may not want their traffic to be
redirected. Therefore, we used an alternative routing approach
that can work entirely on the mobile device, without the need
of a VPN server, as described next.
2. Mobile-Only Routing: Routing IP datagrams to target
hosts through layer-4 sockets requires a translation between
layer-3 datagrams and layer-4 packets. For outgoing traffic,
data of the IP datagrams has to be extracted and sent directly
to the target hosts through UDP/TCP sockets. When a target
host responds, its response data is read from the UDP/TCP
sockets and must be wrapped in IP datagrams, which are
then written to the TUN interface. The Mobile-Only design
removes the dependency on a VPN server, thus making
AntMonitor self-contained and easy to scale. Furthermore,
this design enhances user privacy as all data can now stay on
the mobile device and is not routed through a middlebox. Only
when the user opts in, select packets are temporarily logged
on the AntMonitor App, and then uploaded to the remote
LogServer, as described in the next section.
C. System Implementation
The AntMonitor system architecture is shown in Fig. 1: it
consists of the AntMonitor App and a LogServer.
1) On the Mobile: AntMonitor App: Our current proto-
type is an Android app2. In addition to traffic interception and
routing, the app contains a Graphical User Interface (GUI)
and modules for logging (Log) and real-time and/or offline
Analysis of packets (see Fig. 1).
2It relies on the VPN service which is available on 95%, i.e. billions, of
Android devices today. The VPN API has also just been released on iOS
version 9.0+ in Sep. 2015; thus, this approach can be implemented on iOS,
although our prototype is in android.
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Fig. 2: Screenshots of the AntMonitor prototype v0.1.5. (a)(b) apply to all uses of the app. (c-f) are specific to Privacy Leaks.
(f) shows which apps send packets to which IP destinations for all active connections and is updated in real-time.
Fig. 2 shows screenshots of AntMonitor App’s GUI
for the AntMonitor App v0.1.5, as available in open beta-
testing on Google Play [51]. It allows the user to turn the
background VPN service on and off Fig. 2(a), and to select
which applications should be monitored and logged as in Fig.
2(b) (currently disabled on Google Play [51], but internally it
can allow users to contribute full packets or headers only). Fig.
2(f) displays to which destination (e.g. servers) each app sends
data as a graph of connections updated in real-time. Fig. 2(c),
2(d) and 2(e) are related to the application of privacy leakage
detection described in Section V-A.
The Forwarder manages the TUN interface and routes
network traffic. It consists of two main components: UDP and
TCP Forwarder, both depicted in Fig. 1.
The UDP Forwarder is simpler, since UDP connections are
stateless. When an app sends out an IP datagram containing a
UDP packet, the UDP Forwarder records the mapping of the
source and destination tuples (a tuple consists of an IP address
and a port number), to be used later for reverse lookup. The
Forwarder then extracts the data of the UDP packet and sends
the data to the remote host through a protected UDP socket.
When a response is read from the UDP socket, the Forwarder
creates a new IP datagram, changes the destination tuple to
the corresponding source tuple in the recorded mapping, and
writes the datagram to TUN.
The TCP Forwarder works like a proxy server. For each
TCP connection made by an app on the device, a TCP
Forwarder instance is created. This instance maintains the
TCP connection with the app by responding to IP datagrams
read from the TUN interface with appropriately constructed IP
datagrams. This entails following the states of a TCP connec-
tion (LISTEN, SYN_RECEIVED, ESTABLISHED, etc.) on
both sides (app and TCP Forwarder) and careful construction
of TCP packets with appropriate flags (SYN, ACK, RST,
etc.), options, and sequence and acknowledgment numbers.
At the same time, the TCP Forwarder creates an external TCP
connection to the intended remote host through a protected
socket to forward the data that the app sent to the server and
the response data from the server to the app.
The Analysis Module can do both offline and online
analysis on intercepted packets. The online capability allows
it to take action on live traffic, e.g., preventing private in-
formation from leaking. Since the analyses are done on the
mobile, private information is never leaked out of the device,
setting AntMonitor apart from systems like Meddle [13],
that perform leakage analysis at a VPN server. In order to
inspect encrypted traffic, we implement a TLS proxy: see Sec.
V-A.
The Log Module writes packets to log files on the device,
subject to the user preferences of what apps and what infor-
mation (e.g. entire packets or just packet headers) to log. This
module can add rich contextual information to the captured
packets by using the PCAP Next Generation format [50]; e.g.
we currently store application names and network statistics
(discussed in detail in Sec. V-B) alongside the raw packets.
The mapping to app names is done by looking up the packets’
source and destination IPs and port numbers in the list of
active connections available in /proc/net, which provides the
UIDs of apps responsible for each connection. Given a UID,
we get the corresponding package name using Android APIs.
Finally, the Log Module periodically uploads the log files to
LogServer over HTTPS, when the device is charging and is
connected to Wi-Fi or upon user’s request.
2) Data Collection Server: LogServer: The Log Man-
ager supports uploading of files using multi-part content-type
HTTPS. For each uploaded file, it checks if the file is in proper
PCAPNG format. If so, for each mobile, the manager stores
all of its files in a separate folder.
The Analysis Module extracts features from the log files
and inserts them into a MySQL database to support various
types of analyses. Compared to the Analysis Module of the
AntMonitor App, this module (on the LogServer) has access
to crowdsourced data from a large number of devices, and
can perform global large-scale analyses. For instance, it could
detect global threats and outbreaks of malicious traffic.
D. Novelty of Design
The key novelty of our design is that we are able to use the
minimum number of resources to achieve highest performance.
Specifically, we use the minimum number of: (i) threads (two)
for network routing, and (ii) sockets.
6Thread Allocation. We have fully utilized Java New I/O
(NIO) with non-blocking sockets for the implementation of the
Forwarder. In particular, Forwarder is implemented as a high-
performance (proxy) server, that is capable of serving hundreds
of TCP connections (made by the apps) at once, while using
only two threads: one thread is for reading IP datagrams
from the TUN and another thread is for actual network
I/O using the Java NIO Selector and for writing to TUN.
Minimizing the number of threads used is critical on a resource
constrained mobile platform so that AntMonitor (which runs
in the background) does not interfere with other apps that run
in the foreground. For comparison, Privacy Guard creates
one thread per TCP connection, which rapidly exhausts the
system resources even in a benign scenario, e.g., opening the
CNN.com page could create about 50 TCP connections, which
results in low performance (see Sec. IV).
Socket Allocation. Since the Forwarder needs to create
sockets to forward data and the Android system imposes a
limit of 1024 open file descriptors per user process, sockets
must be carefully managed. To this end, we minimize the
number of sockets used by the Forwarder by (i) multiplexing
the use of UDP sockets: we use a single UDP socket for all
UDP connections, and (ii) carefully managing the life cycle of
a TCP socket to reclaim it as soon as the server or the client
closes the connection. For comparison, Privacy Guard uses 1
socket per UDP connection and 2 sockets per TCP connection;
Haystack uses 1 socket per UDP connection and 1 socket per
TCP connection.
E. Performance Optimization
Since the AntMonitor App processes raw IP datagrams
in user-space, it is highly non-trivial to achieve good perfor-
mance. We investigated the performance bottlenecks of our
approach specifically and VPN approaches in general. These
bottlenecks are depicted in Fig. 3. We then address these
bottlenecks through a combination of techniques, from typical
optimization techniques (including implementing custom na-
tive C libraries and deploying high-performance network I/O
patterns) to highly customized techniques that we specifically
devised for the VPN-based architecture. We also provide a
detailed comparison of our design to Privacy Guard [10]
(whose source code is publicly available); in contrast, Hay-
stack’s source code is unavailable, therefore we qualitatively
compare a subset of techniques that we could infer from
Haystack’s description [11] and our observations.
Traffic Routing (Points 1, 2, and 3). The techniques
that we adopted are as follows: (i) we explicitly manage and
utilize a Direct ByteBuffer for I/O operations with the TUN
interface and the sockets, (ii) we store packet data in byte
arrays, and (iii) we minimize the number of copy operations
and any operations that traverse through the data byte-by-byte.
These techniques are based on the following observations:
Direct ByteBuffer gives the best I/O performance because it
eliminates copy operations when I/O is performed in native
code. Plus, Direct ByteBuffer on Android is actually backed
by an array (which is not typically the case on a general
Linux platform); therefore, it creates synergy with byte arrays:
Fig. 3: Performance Optimization.
making a copy of the buffer to a byte array (for manipulation)
can be done efficiently by performing a memory block copy as
opposed to iterating through the buffer byte-by-byte. (Memory
copy is also used whenever a copy of the data is needed, e.g.,
for IP datagram construction.) Finally, because the allocation
of a Direct ByteBuffer is an expensive operation, we carefully
manage its life cycle: for an I/O operation, i.e., read from TUN,
we reuse the buffer for every operation instead of allocating a
new one.
TUN Read/Write (Point 1). The Android API does not
provide a way to poll the TUN interface for available data.
The official Android tutorial [52], as well as Privacy Guard
and Haystack [10], [11], employ periodic sleeping (e.g., 100
ms) between read attempts. This results in wasted CPU cycles
if sleeping time is small, or in slow read speed if the sleeping
time is large, as the data may be available more frequently
than the sleep time. To address this issue, we implemented a
native C library that performs the native poll() to read data to
a Direct ByteBuffer (which is then available in the Java code
without extra copies).
It is also important to read from (and write to) the TUN
interface in large blocks to avoid the high overhead of crossing
the Java-Native boundary and of the system calls (read()
and write()). In early implementations, we observed that IP
datagrams read from the TUN interface have a maximum size
of 576 B (which is the minimal IPv4 datagram size). This
results in maximum read speed of about 25 Mbps on a Nexus
6 for a TCP connection, thus limiting the upload speed. We
were able to increase the datagram size by (i) increasing the
MTU of the TUN interface to a large value, e.g., 16 KB and
(ii) including an appropriate Maximum Segment Size (MSS) in
the TCP Options field of SYN-ACKs sent by TCP Forwarder
when responding to apps’ SYN datagrams. These changes
help to ensure that an app can acquire a high MTU when
performing Path MTU Discovery, so that each read from TUN
results in a large IP datagram. This results in the maximum
read speed, i.e., more than 80 Mbps on our Nexus 6. Similarly,
it is important to write to TUN in large blocks: we construct
large IP datagrams to write to TUN. We have experimented
with other large block values (e.g., 8K, 32K) and found that
16 KB achieved the highest throughput on Nexus 6.
Socket Read/Write (Point 3). Similar to when interacting
with the TUN interface, in order to achieve high throughput,
it is important to read from (and write to) TCP sockets in
large blocks. In particular, we match the size of the buffer
used for socket read (e.g., 16 KB minus 40 B for TCP and IP
headers) to the size of the buffer used for TUN write (e.g., 16
KB). Similarly, we also matched the size of the buffer used for
socket write to that of the buffer used for TUN read. Thus,
sending a large IP datagram read from TUN might involve
7sending several smaller IP datagrams (from the TCP network
socket), i.e., fragmentation; however, this is done efficiently in
the kernel space. For comparison, Privacy Guard does not
implement this matching.
Packet-App Mapping (Point 2). Android keeps active
network connections in four separate files in the /proc/net
directory: one each for UDP, TCP via IPv4 and IPv6. Be-
cause parsing these files is an expensive I/O operation, we
implemented the reading and parsing in a native C library.
Furthermore, to minimize the number of times we have to
read and parse them, we store the mapping of app names
to source/destination IPs and port numbers in a Hash Map.
When the Log Module receives a new packet, it first checks
the Map for the given IP and port number pair. If the mapping
does not exist, the Log Module re-parses the /proc files and
updates the Map. Privacy Guard and Haystack also provide
packet-app mapping, but their implementation is in Java, and
Privacy Guard does not provide logging.
DPI: Deep Packet Inspection (Point 2). Although inspect-
ing every packet is costly, we leverage the Aho-Corasick algo-
rithm [53] written in native C to perform real-time detection
without significantly impacting throughput and resource usage
(see Sec. IV-A3). However, this alone is not enough: we must
also minimize the number of copies of each packet. Although
the algorithm generally operates on Strings, AntMonitor App
uses Direct ByteBuffers for routing, and creating a String out
of a ByteBuffer object costs us one extra copy. Moreover,
Java Strings use UTF-16 encoding and JNI Strings are in
Modified UTF-8 format. Therefore, any String passed from
Java to native C requires another copy while converting from
UTF-16 to UTF-8 [54]. To avoid two extra copies, we pass the
Direct ByteBuffer object and let the Aho-Corasick algorithm
interpret the bytes in memory as characters. This enables
us to perform an order of magnitude faster than Java-based
approaches (Sec. IV-C), i.e., compared to Privacy Guard’s
Java-based string matching and Haystack’s Java-based Aho-
Corasick implementation.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Tool. In order to evaluate AntMonitor, we built a custom
app – AntEvaluator. It transfers files and computes a number
of performance metrics, including network throughput, CPU
and memory usage, and power consumption. It helps us tightly
control the setup and compute metrics that are not available
using off-the-shelf tools, such as Speedtest.
Scenarios. We use AntEvaluator in two types of exper-
iments. In Sec. IV-A, Stress Test performs downloads and
uploads of large files so that AntMonitor has to continuously
process packets. In Sec. IV-B, Idle Test considers an idling
mobile device so that AntMonitor handles very few packets.
In between the two extremes, we have also considered a
Typical Day Test, which simulates user interaction with apps;
however, it is omitted due to lack of space.
Baselines. We report the performance of AntMonitor
v0.0.1 and compare it to state-of-the-art baselines from Sec.
II-A:
• Raw Device: no VPN service running on the device; this
is the ideal performance limit to compare against.
• State-of-the-art mobile-only approaches:
Privacy Guard [10] v1.0 and Haystack [11] v1.0.0.8.
(We omit the testing of tPacketCapture [17] since it
was shown to have very poor performance in [15].)
• Client-server VPN approaches: industrial grade Strong-
Swan VPN client v1.5.0 with server v5.2.1, and an Ant-
Monitor Client-Server implementation based on [15].3
The VPN servers used by each app were hosted on the
same machine.
Setup. All experiments were performed on a Nexus 6, with
Android 5.0, a Quad-Core 2.7 Ghz CPU, 3 GB RAM, and
3220 mAh battery. Nexus 6 has a built-in hardware sensor,
Maxim MAX17050, that allows us to measure battery con-
sumption accurately. Throughout the experiments, the device
was unplugged from power, the screen remained on, and the
battery was above 30%. To minimize background traffic, we
performed all experiments during late night hours in our lab
to avoid interference, we did not sign into Google on the
device, and we kept only pre-installed apps and the apps
being tested. Unless stated otherwise, the apps being tested
had TLS interception disabled and the AntMonitor App
was logging full packets of all applications and inspecting all
outgoing packets. In terms of versions, all tests were done with
AntMonitor v0.0.1 and Haystack v1.0.0.8, unless indicated
otherwise (Sec. IV-A1). VPN servers ran on a Linux machine
with 48-Core 800 Mhz CPU, 512 GB RAM, 1 Gbit Internet;
the Wi-Fi network was 2.4Ghz 802.11ac. Each test case was
repeated 10 times and we report the average.
A. Stress Test
1) Large File Over a Single Flow: Setup. For this set of
experiments, we use AntEvaluator to perform downloads
and uploads of a 500 MB file over a single TCP connection.
In the background, AntEvaluator periodically measures the
following metrics:
A. Network Throughput: AntEvaluator reports the number
of bytes transferred after the first 10 sec (to allow the TCP
connection to reach its top speed) and the transfer duration.
We use these numbers to calculate throughput.
B. Memory Usage: AntEvaluator uses the top command
to sample the Resident Set Size (RSS) value.
C. Battery Usage: AntEvaluator uses the APIs available
with the hardware power sensor Maxim MAX17050 to com-
pute the energy consumption during each test in mAh [55].
D. CPU Usage: AntEvaluator uses the top command to
measure the CPU usage.
At the end of each experiment, AntEvaluator reports
the calculated throughput and battery usage, and the average
memory and CPU (considering the sum of CPU usage of
AntEvaluator and the VPN app) usage.
Results for AntMonitor v0.0.1 in Dec. 2015. Fig. 4(a)
shows that the download throughput of AntMonitor signifi-
cantly outperforms all other approaches. It was able to achieve
about 94% of the raw speed, with throughput 2x more than
3In the labels of the performance figures, we refer to this baseline for
comparison as “AM. Client-Server,” to distinguish it from the actual proposed
AntMonitor, referred to as “AM. Mobile-Only”.
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Fig. 4: Performance of all VPN apps in Stress Test for a 500 MB file on Wi-Fi. (“AM.” stands for AntMonitor. “AM. Mobile-
Only” stands for AntMonitor proposed in this paper. “AM. Client-Server” is only used as a baseline for comparison.)
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Fig. 5: Performance of updated apps (in Feb. 2017) in Stress Test for a 500 MB file on Wi-Fi, and performance of all VPN
apps during device idle time.
StrongSwan & Privacy Guard and 2.6x more than Hay-
stack. We further note that all VPN apps tested have similar
memory, battery, and CPU usage.4 Fig. 4(b) reports the upload
performance. AntMonitor achieves 76% of the raw speed
while performing data logging and DPI. Most significantly,
its performance is 8x faster than both state-of-the-art mobile-
only approaches.5 StrongSwan outperforms AntMonitor as
expected since, unlike with incoming packets, AntMonitor
performs DPI on each outgoing packet. Nevertheless, Fig. 4(c)
shows that AntMonitor has the higher upload speed (and
closest to the raw speed) if DPI is disabled. Fig. 4(b) also
shows that all VPN apps have similar memory and CPU usage,
except for Haystack, which incurs significant overhead. Since
the test took longer for the slower approaches, Privacy Guard
and Haystack used significantly more battery.
In general, using any VPN service roughly doubles the CPU
usage during peak network activity. Although the CPU usage
4Although StrongSwan does not perform L3-L4 translation, it performs
encryption and decryption, which results in about 5% higher CPU usage than
AntMonitor.
5The gains provided by the optimizations discussed in Sec. III-E have a
greater impact on upload speeds because both Privacy Guard and Haystack
favor downstream traffic since the responses from the Internet are read as
streams from sockets and the responses from applications are read from TUN
packet-by-packet [11].
of 38–90% on Wi-Fi seems high, the maximum CPU usage
on the quad-core Nexus 6 is 400%. In summary, this set of
experiments demonstrates that among all VPN approaches,
for both downlink and uplink, AntMonitor has the highest
throughput while having similar or lower CPU, memory, and
battery consumption.
Results for AntMonitor v0.1.5 in Feb. 2017. Since the
time we performed the above evaluation (in Dec. 2015),
both AntMonitor and Haystack (now renamed to “Lumen”)
were updated on GooglePlay, to versions 0.1.5 and 1.1.2,
respectively. The main change for AntMonitor from version
0.0.1 to 0.1.5 was improving (and making more complex) the
GUI and disabling packet logging (in order to avoid dealing
with the PIIs of the general public participating in the open-
beta); the underlying design (including key optimizations, such
as the use of two threads and minimum number of sockets,
and the optimized reading/writing from the TUN) remains
the same. The internal changes in Haystack/Lumen beyond
the GUI are not available to us but the design of the system
appears to remain the same, according to [56]. To see how the
updates affected the performance of both apps, we repeated
a set of stress tests and we report these results separately in
Fig. 5(a-b). The network conditions have changed since the
original tests were performed: NoVpn throughput is now 100
9Mbps and 78 Mbps on the downlink and uplink, respectively.
Haystack v1.1.2 has improved its download throughput to 43
Mbps, and AntMonitor reached 96% of the raw speed with a
96 Mbps throughput. The newer Haystack (Lumen) app also
has improved its upload throughput to 26 Mbps. The latest
AntMonitor has stayed in the 70% range of the raw upload
speed with a 56 Mbps throughput. This confirms that the
design and optimization techniques applied to AntMonitor
still result in significant performance benefits, despite the
added complexity of the updated GUI.
2) Small Files Over Multiple Flows: Setup. To test the
efficiency of AntMonitor’s thread and socket allocation, we
used AntEvaluator to create 16 threads, each downloading
a 50MB file. During the test AntEvaluator calculated the
throughput of each flow and reported the average of all flows.
Results. The average speed of a flow (in Mbps) for each
test case was the following: Raw Device: 6.82, AntMonitor:
6.57, Privacy Guard: 4.75, StrongSwan: 3.73, Haystack:
3.18, and AntMonitor Client-Server: 3.06. Again, Ant-
Monitor came out on top, achieving 96% of the raw speed.
3) Impact of Logging and DPI: Setup. To assess the
overhead caused by Logging Data and Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI), we performed the single-flow upload stress test on
AntMonitor with all four combinations of Logging on/off
and DPI on/off.
Results. First, Fig. 4(c) shows that logging does not have
a significant impact on throughput. This is thanks to (i) the
optimization of AntMonitor that uses only two threads for
network I/O (see Sec. III-E) and (ii) the fact that the data
collection uses two threads for storage I/O. These data logging
threads do not significantly impact main network I/O threads
on a quad-core Nexus 6 phone. Second, DPI is performed
by one of the main network I/O threads and inflicts a 17%
slow-down on upload speed. Although 17% is a significant
overhead, AntMonitor is still able to reach over 60 Mbps
speed, which is more than enough for mobile apps. In addition,
DPI causes a 28% and 33% overhead on battery and CPU,
respectively. However, the CPU usage still remains 1/8 of the
total possible CPU available on the Nexus 6 (of 400%), thus
the overhead is acceptable. Finally, without logging and DPI,
AntMonitor achieves 94% of the raw speed without VPN.
4) Impact of TLS Proxy: In order to be able to inspect
encrypted traffic for privacy leaks, we implemented a TLS
proxy, described in Sec. V-A.
Setup. To evaluate the performance impact of this proxy,
we used AntEvaluator to download a 500MB file from a
secure server over HTTPS and compared the throughput of
AntMonitor to that of the Raw Device.
Results. The average throughput (in Mbps) was 77.2 and
69.1 for the Raw Device and AntMonitor, respectively. As
expected, the proxy causes a significant overhead since it uses
an extra socket for each connection and performs one extra
decryption and encryption operation per packet.
B. Idle Test
Setup. For this set of experiments, we kept the phone idle
for 2 minutes with only background apps running. We used
1
2
/3
0
/1
4
0
1
/2
2
/1
5
0
2
/1
4
/1
5
0
3
/0
9
/1
5
0
4
/0
1
/1
5
0
4
/2
4
/1
5
0
5
/1
7
/1
5
0
6
/0
9
/1
5
0
7
/0
2
/1
5
0
7
/2
5
/1
5
0
8
/1
7
/1
5
0
9
/0
9
/1
5
1
0
/0
2
/1
5
1
0
/2
5
/1
5
1
1
/1
7
/1
5
1
2
/1
0
/1
5
Time
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
U
se
ID
Fig. 6: Data logged daily by different users in the study. (We
omitted some users, and we have included different devices
belonging to the same individual (e.g. 7-11).)
AntEvaluator to measure the battery and memory consump-
tion of each VPN app. We also measured the aggregate CPU
usage across all apps by summing the System and User %
CPU Usage provided by the top command.
Results. Fig. 5(c) shows that all apps tested create very little
additional overhead when the device is in idle mode. Among
the mobile-only approaches, Haystack and AntMonitor used
more CPU than Privacy Guard because both of them have
threads to log packets while Privacy Guard does not. Sim-
ilarly, Logging also results in slightly higher memory usage
for Haystack and AntMonitor. (Note that StrongSwan does
not log packets either, thus has lower CPU usage.) Finally,
the overall memory usage of the VPN apps (~105 MB) is
acceptable; many other popular apps, e.g. Facebook, use as
much as 200 MB of RAM.
C. Metrics Computed Outside AntEvaluator
Latency. We measured the latency of each VPN app by
averaging over several pings to a nearby server (in the same
city). In order of increasing delay, the apps rank as follows:
NoVpn: 3 ms, StrongSwan: 4 ms, Haystack: 4 ms, Ant-
Monitor Client-Server: 5 ms, AntMonitor: 7 ms, and Pri-
vacy Guard: 83 ms. Compared to client-server approaches,
mobile-only approaches cannot forward ICMP packets; thus,
we measure latency using TCP packets. The additional delay
is due to the time required to create, send, and receive packets
through TCP sockets. Compared to Haystack, AntMonitor
has a small additional latency as sending and receiving TCP
packets involves two threads (one reads/writes the packet
from/to TUN and one reads/writes the packet from/to the
socket), whereas Haystack might have used a single thread
(source code unavailable).
String Parsing. The main heavy operation required in DPI
is string parsing. During real traffic conditions, our native C
implementation of Aho-Corasick has a maximum run time of
25 ms. When benchmarking as a standalone library (running
on the Android main thread alone), our parsing time is <10
ms. For comparison, Haystack reports a 167 ms maximum
run time for string parsing with Aho-Corasick.
V. APPLICATIONS
Because AntMonitor intercepts every packet in and out of
the device, it is uniquely positioned to serve as a platform
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App Name Leak Type # Flows
VnExpress.net IMEI, Phone#, Loca-
tion, Email, DeviceID
33147
Zing Mp3 IMEI, DeviceID 14745
Clean Master DeviceID 1768
WiFi Maps IMEI, Location 1582
Relay for reddit Location 638
System IMEI, Location, Devi-
ceID
301
Chrome Location 143
ES File Expl. DeviceID 96
MyFitnessPal Location 76
DR Radio DeviceID 68
Speedtest Location 48
DexKnows IMEI,Location 47
Skype IMEI, DeviceID 42
iWindsurf IMEI, Location 22
WhatsApp Phone# 20
· · · · · · · · ·
All All 52923
Domain Name # Flows
eclick.vn. 8760
api.mp3.zing.vn. 7561
ksmobile.com. 620
zaloapp.com. 332
ngoisao.net. 209
api.staircase3.com. 150
openweathermap.org. 47
adtima.vn. 36
ads.adap.tv. 31
apps.ad-x.co.uk. 30
adkmob.com. 27
whatsapp.net. 27
mopub.com. 25
duapps.com. 25
api.dexknows.com. 24
server.radio-fm.us. 15
inmobi.com. 14
· · · · · ·
All 18020
TABLE I: Flows Leaking PII found in the collected data. (Note: the
number of flows at the left (52923) is higher than at the right (18020)
because we count a flow that leaks multiple PIIs multiple times.)
for enabling applications that build on top of its passive
monitoring capability. We showcase three such applications
that may be of interest to operators and/or individual users: (i)
privacy leaks detection, (ii) network performance monitoring,
and (iii) traffic/user profiling. We report results from a pilot
user study at our university campus: Fig. 6 shows the daily
activity of 11 (with re-installs) volunteers: these are members
of our own research group, who used AntMonitor on their
primary phones during the period Feb. 5 – Nov. 30, 2015 and
uploaded their data to LogServer. This study was meant only
as a proof of concept of the capabilities of AntMonitor and
not as as representative large scale user study.
A. Application I: Privacy Leaks
Mobile devices today have access to personally identifiable
information (PII) and they routinely leak it through the net-
work, often to third parties without the user’s knowledge. PII
includes: (i) mobile phone IDs, such as IMEI (which uniquely
identifies a device within a mobile network), and Android
Device ID; and (ii) information that can uniquely identify the
user (such as phone number, email address, or even credit card)
or other information (e.g. location, demographics). Sometimes
sending out PII is necessary for the operation of the phone
(e.g. a device must identify itself to connect to a wireless
network) or of the apps (e.g. location must be obtained for
location-based services). However, the leak may not serve the
user (e.g. going to advertisers or analytics companies) or may
even be malicious. Leaks in plain text can be intercepted by
listening third parties, e.g. in public WiFi networks. Although
modern mobile platforms (Android, iOS, Windows) require
that apps obtain permission before requesting access to certain
resources, and isolate apps (execution, memory, storage) from
each other, this is not sufficient to prevent information from
leaking out of the device, e.g. due to interaction between apps
[57]. Even worse, users are unaware of how their data are used
[58].
Privacy Leaks Detection and Prevention Module. We
extended the basic AntMonitor functionality with an analysis
module that performs real-time DPI. The user can define
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Fig. 7: Amount of traffic sent to ad & analytics servers
strings that correspond to private information that should be
prevented from leaking; see screenshot in Fig. 2(c). Before
sending out a packet, the AntMonitor App inspects it and
searches for any of those strings. By default, if the string is
found, AntMonitor hashes it (with a random string of the
same length, so as not to alter the payload length) before
sending the packet out, and asks the user what to do in
the future for the given string/app combination, as shown
in Fig. 2(d). The user can choose to allow future packets
to be sent out unaltered, block them, or keep hashing the
sensitive string (so that the application has a good chance to
continue working but without the string being leaked). The
system remembers the action to take in the future for the
same app and “leak,” and it will no longer bother the user
with notifications. The user may also look at the history of the
leaks, shown in Fig. 2(e). AntMonitor can provides both real-
time detection and prevention, on the mobile-device (not at the
server) thanks to its efficient implementation, while Haystack
and Privacy Guard do not achieve both; and Recon can
achieve the same on the server, and could gracefully run on
top of AntMonitor as well. Specifically, AntMonitor can
inspect a packet for leaks in <10 ms (Sec. IV-C), and it was
the first app to demonstrate this real-time capability in [47].
Encrypted Traffic. Since we require plain text in order
to perform DPI, and much of the traffic is encrypted, we
developed a TLS proxy that uses the SandroProxy library [59],
also used by Privacy Guard, to intercept secure connections,
decrypt the packets, and then re-encrypt them before sending
them to their intended Internet hosts. This method works for
most apps, but it cannot intercept traffic from highly sensitive
apps, such as banking apps, that use certificate pinning. Due to
the intrusive nature of intercepting TLS/SSL traffic, we allow
users to disable this option.
Privacy Leaks Detected. We analyzed the data collected
from our user study, and found a large number of privacy
leaks in plain text. Table I presents the apps and destination
domains with the highest number of flows leaking. The worst
offender in the list was the app VnExpress.net that leaked
five different types of PII up to 33,145 times towards the
domain eclick.vn – an advertising network. The list of leaking
apps includes very popular apps with tens of millions of
downloads, such as Skype and WhatsApp, and the list of
domains includes many mobile ad networks (such as mopub,
inmobi, adkmob, adtima). Using the data collected by
AntMonitor at the users’ mobile devices, we calculated
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Exp # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AM: W=1 30.00 32.79 24.49 31.95 34.78 32.31 31.02
AM: W=5 21.24 29.26 22.83 27.01 30.75 26.84 26.14
Speedtest 19.96 28.42 22.39 28.74 31.66 26.98 27.22
TABLE II: Throughput (Download Mbps): Active (using
Speedtest) vs Passive (using AntMonitor: AM) measurements.
First, we ran multiple Speedtests, with 5 min gaps, from the same
location, and we list the throughput mentioned by Speedtest. Second,
we computed the (maximum) average throughput using AntMonitor
logs, over a window of 1 & 5 sec. Our approach is close to Speedtest
but does not incur any measurement overhead. For a fair comparison
in this table, we passively monitored the Speedtest packets using
AntMonitor. In the wild, throughput computations can be made by
counting the bytes of actual traffic sent over time.
Metric Data Overhead Memory CPU Battery
Speedtest 50 MB 116 MB 14.7% −0.5%
AntMonitor 0 MB 134MB 43.4% −0.7%
TABLE III: Resources Utilization for AntMonitor vs. Speedtest.
the amount of data that is transmitted from/to ad networks,
analytics and mediation services. Fig. 7 shows that the amount
of traffic transmitted towards such servers for the top 20
domains is in the order of GBs, consists of several domains,
and tens of thousands of flows per domain. Fig. 2(f) visualizes
the destinations for one device: it shows which apps leak
information to which destinations.
Discussion. The inherent advantage of AntMonitor in this
domain is that it runs on the device, which is a more attractive
place for users to perform PII scrubbing than a middlebox,
since sensitive data does not have to leave the device. Traffic
encrypted at the application level can also be intercepted
and inspected by the TLS proxy in AntMonitor, then re-
encrypted, if the user chooses to do so (by agreeing to install
a root certificate). One limitation of our current approach is
that PII leakage is detected using string matching, which can
be evaded by a more sophisticated attacker, who can leak
information across multiple packets or by encoding the text
to be leaked. At its current state, our privacy leaks detection
is mostly useful for raising awareness of the magnitude, nature
and cost of PII leaking, and can be useful in the case of an
honest-but-curious adversary. For example, a legitimate app
that leaks information to trackers is likely to stop doing so
if users become aware and start uninstalling the app. The on-
device visualization shown on Fig. 2(f) displays the destination
(IP address, hostname/domain, and type of server) to which
each app sends data for all active connections and it is updated
in real-time. Another inherent advantage of running privacy
leak detection on the device (as opposed to the middle server)
is the access to contextual information available on the device
(such as the app that generated the traffic), which can be used
to detect more sophisticated PII leaks with machine learning.
B. Application II: Performance Measurements
In this section, we demonstrate how to use AntMonitor
for monitoring network performance, which can benefit users
(e.g., to manage their network access or cost) as well as
operators (e.g., to assess and improve their infrastructure
[27]). Inherent advantages of AntMonitor in this application
domain include the following: (i) passive performance mon-
itoring comes for free (without the need for active probing
overhead) since AntMonitor touches every packet transmitted
or received; (ii) the ability to correlate network-level metrics
(e.g., WiFi and cellular speed) with other information available
on the device (e.g., signal strength, type of network, location,
time); (iii) the fine-granularity of measurements at the device,
app, flow, or destination level.
Performance Module. By design, AntMonitor intercepts
every packet and is thus able to passively compute perfor-
mance indicators of the TCP/IP layer, such as throughput and
latency. In addition, it can monitor performance at other layers
(e.g., the radio layer) and collect rich contextual information
including but not limited to: (i) timestamp; (ii) geolocation
in a way that achieves a low energy footprint6; (iii) network
information (e.g., WiFi or Cellular), radio access technology
(RAT), and detailed cellular network information per region
(e.g., LTE parameters, frequency bands); (iv) received signal
strength (RSS), and (v) throughput and latency measurements
per app and overall. For the purposes of this paper, we append
RSS, geolocation, RAT, and network connectivity information
in PCAPNG files based on network connectivity/location
events posted by the OS. The analysis of the collected data is
done offline at LogServer.
We utilize our module to passively compute the smart-
phone’s throughput and we compare it to a state-of-the-art
active monitoring tool (Speedtest). Table II shows that the
values are very close, but our passive approach does not incur
any data overhead. Resources usage by these two methods
is shown in Table III. For a fair comparison in Table II, we
passively monitored the Speedtest packets using AntMonitor.
In the wild, throughput computations can be made by counting
the number of bytes of actual traffic sent over time.
Example Measurements. In the rest of the section, we
report measurements collected on our campus (for one month
Nov.7-Dec. 7, 2015 and among approx. 10 people in our
group) including: reference signal received power (RSRP) for
LTE network and device throughput (both WiFi and cellular).
Fig. 9 shows the data (MB) used by one user throughout
a typical day (i.e., averaged over all week or weekend days)
per network (WiFi or Cellular). One can see the breakdown
of the traffic into WiFi and cellular, the daily pattern and
the difference between week and weekend. Such statistics
are currently reported by mobile devices, but typically at a
very coarse granularity (e.g., total amount of data left for
this month). In contrast, AntMonitor can report data at fine
granularity (e.g., per flow, per app, per location, over time,
etc.) and can enable a vast number of monitoring applications,
troubleshooting, and SDN operations.
In ongoing work, we plan to incorporate this module of
AntMonitor to the open beta app, and crowdsource per-
formance measurements, which can provide a comprehensive
view of network-wide performance. As an illustrative example,
6AntMonitor listens to location updates by other applications passively
and only supplements that with infrequent active requests.
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Fig. 8: Performance maps from the university campus. (a) Monitor a large area with only a few users. (b) The university has many areas
with moderate to poor LTE coverage and many spatial variations. However, low RSRP (location 1) does not necessarily mean low cellular
throughput (for the same carrier).
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Fig. 9: Single user’s point of view: #MB downloaded, averaged
over all (a) week or (b) weekend days, for one month, for one user.
Fig. 8 depicts 5 such performance maps we built for our uni-
versity campus, reporting signal strength and QoS parameters
per cellular carrier and WiFi. Fig. 8(a) depicts the location of
5 users reported during the one month period (Nov. 7-Dec.
7, 2015): only with a few users, we are able to cover a large
area of the campus. Network performance varies throughout
the day, but thanks to minimal battery overhead, AntMonitor
can monitor it continuously and passively, allowing us to
collect time-series of network performance. Fig. 8(b) depicts
the LTE RSRP for one cellular provider: LTE reception is
poor on many areas and has large spatial variation. Fig.
8(b) also reports the average throughput of WiFi and cellular
networks on campus and compares it to LTE RSRP. This
information can, for example, be used to inform decisions
about switching among, as well as to better provision these
networks. Interestingly, in Fig. 8(b), location 1 has low RSRP
but high cellular throughput. With the increasing complexity
of cellular networks, AntMonitor can help by simultaneously
assessing multiple layers of network performance.
C. Application III: Learning Network-Level Behavior
AntMonitor passively monitors all network traffic in and
out of the device and can use TCP/IP header features and other
contextual information to learn profiles at different levels of
granularity, including: per device, app, flow, destination, etc.
These can enable anomaly detection, user profiling, market
research, traffic differentiation, etc. A key, inherent advantage
of AntMonitor, in this application domain, is that it has
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Fig. 10: Classification of Flows to Mobile Apps based on TCP/IP
features. Normalized confusion matrix for all features. Parentheses
show #flows used in training & testing.
access to rich contextual information available on the device
(e.g. location, time, background/foreground apps, application
that generated the packets7 ) that can be used to train accurate
classification models. We demonstrate two examples: (i) flow
classification to mobile apps they belong to, see Sec. V-C1
and (ii) learning user profiles from the apps they use, see Sec.
V-C2. These can be useful building blocks for anomaly detec-
tion (on the device), traffic differentiation (by the ISP), market
research, etc. Training and classification can be performed on
the device (Log module in the AntMonitor App) and/or at
the LogServer (where data is contributed by multiple devices).
In the rest of the section, we report results from the latter.
1) Application classification: We use packet headers col-
lected in the user study, together with app names that generated
the traffic, to train models and classify flows to mobile apps.
We used supervised learning to build a multi-class model that
classifies network flows to apps. For each flow, we extracted
66 flow features from layer-3 and layer-4 headers (i.e. payload
and packet size statistics, burstiness, packet inter-arrival times,
7 For example, although not the first to classify traffic based on packet
headers, AntMonitor has an advantage because it operates on the device:
for every packet AntMonitor intercepts, it can identify the app it belongs to
with 99% accuracy, and append it to the PCAPNG file. This provides ground
truth, which is hard to get.
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Fig. 11: Supervised Classification of Users based on the
normalized volume of their mobile apps activity.
TCP flags, flow statistics, IP features) on the upstream &
downstream directions. We compared different ML models
and selected the Random Forest, which performed best. We
used a 10-fold cross-validation and kept the same proportions
of apps in the testing and training. When we used all features
together, the F-1 score was up to 78%. Flow classification for
an individual user further increases the classification perfor-
mance, with the F-1 score ranging between 75%-93%; this
is expected, since the number of apps per user is smaller
(ranges between 25-70). As a baseline for comparison, ran-
dom uniform and random proportional classification yield F-1
scores of only 1.5% and 5.8% respectively. Meddle reports
a 64.1% precision score in classifying flows for the 92 most
popular Android applications by using payload features (Host
and User-Agent) [13]. For a dataset of millions of applications,
the state-of-the-art approach of AppPrint, that also requires
HTTP header data, achieves 81% flow-set coverage with 91%
precision. Fig. 10 zooms in the results for the top 45 apps and
shows which apps are correctly classified (diagonal entries),
while the few errors (non-zero entries off-diagonal) misclassify
similar apps to each other (e.g., Facebook to FB Messenger, or
Google related apps). The fact that using off-the-shelf learning
tools and only features from TCP/IP headers, AntMonitor
can classify applications better than state-of-the-art approaches
with access to payload, is due to its inherent advantage of
having access to accurate ground truth and user behavior at a
large scale.
2) User Profiling: As a representative example, we asked
the following question: can the users in our study group (see
Fig. 6) can be distinguished from each based on their app ac-
tivity? We model each user as the vector of normalized activity
volume per app, in one day. One interesting fact in our dataset
was that certain users have re-installed AntMonitor during
the study and appear with different user ids. For example, users
7-11 in Fig. 6 are different devices used by the same person
over different time periods. First, we use supervised learning
in which we include users 1-7 in the training dataset and users
1-11 in testing. Fig. 11 shows the confusion matrix: users 1-
7 are correctly classified to themselves, while users 8-10 are
classified mostly as user 7, which is also correct. Interestingly,
user 11 is classified as user 1, which also makes sense: during
that period the 2 users (students in our group) were working
on the same deadline and were using their phones for running
similar apps for testing and performance evaluation. These
results are clearly preliminary but demonstrate AntMonitor’s
potential for user profiling and anomaly detection, a direction
we plan to explore in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The focus of this paper was on the AntMonitor system for
on-device (as opposed to client-server) passive mobile network
monitoring. Although VPN-based approaches have been used
before, AntMonitor’s optimized design minimizes the use
of resources and significantly outperforms previous state-of-
the-art mobile-only approaches, namely Privacy Guard [10]
and Haystack [11]: it achieves 2x and 8x faster (down and
uplink) speeds and close to the raw no-VPN throughput, while
using 2–12x less energy. This significant performance benefit
is crucial for the successful adoption of AntMonitor (users
are unlikely to install apps that slow down their phones or drain
their battery) and for enabling some real-time applications
(e.g., privacy leak prevention was not possible before on a
mobile-only design).
The applications discussed were meant to showcase the
inherent advantage of the AntMonitor system to support
them, and they are a standalone topic on their own right. Our
pilot deployment at our university campus was also limited
to the primary phones of the members of our research group,
for alpha testing purposes and as a proof-of-concept; it was
not meant as a large scale user study. Despite these limitations,
we demonstrated that AntMonitor is a powerful tool for end-
users to understand the behavior (at the network, application,
and device level) of their device, detect and block privacy
leaks, understand where data is transmitted to and correlate
patterns; and for operators to correlated network performance
measurements at various layers.
Our ongoing and future work includes the following. On the
systems side, we have packaged the AntMonitor functionality
as an SDK that can be used by application developers and
researchers inside their own apps. We are currently working
with 4 such partners, and we eventually plan to open-source
the SDK for the research community. Our goal is to increase
our base of end-users, both directly (open beta on GooglePlay)
and indirectly (through the SDK and third party apps). In
terms of applications, we are working on automating the
privacy leaks detection using machine learning and exploiting
the access to ground truth available on the device; and on
distinguishing legitimate use of PIIs vs privacy leaks. More
generally, we envision that the AntMonitor SDK can provide
a crowdsourcing platform for collecting data and enabling
data transparency and performance optimization, with a com-
petitive advantage being its optimized design and superior
performance, combined with the advantages that stem from
running on the device as opposed to a middle server.
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